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Abstract
The importing country usually imposes heterogeneous import tariff rates based on the national origins
of the products. Reducing the tariff rates on the products from one origin country not only increases
the import flows from this country, but also decreases the import flows from the other trade partners
of the importing country. (Direct and relative effects of the import tariff) This paper constructs a
variation of the conventional gravity model to analyze the direct and relative effects of the import tariff
on international trade flows at the industrial level. Based on our theoretical framework, we compute a
new indicator to measure the relative effect and estimate both effects using the Chinese industrial level
data. Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions: (i) if the tariff rates are
reduced towards one origin country, the importing country will import more from this country but reduce
the imports from the other origins; (ii) the relative effect is more effective at the industry or country
where the importing penetration ratio is relatively high; and (iii) omission of the import penetration ratio
will lead to the underestimation of the effects of the multilateral resistance terms on trade performances.
Our research contributes to the existing literature by introducing a manipulable method to compute the
direct and relative effects of the trade cost at the industrial level, which takes the heterogeneity among
industries and countries into account.
JEL classification: F14 F15
Keywords: International trade, Gravity equation, Industrial heterogeneity, China
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1 Introduction
The paper expands the works of Anderson and Wincoop (2003), and Baier and Bergstrand (2009) by applying
their theoretical frameworks and empirical methods, which are mostly used to analyze the effects of trade
costs on trade flows at the national aggregate level, into the study of the relevant issues at the industrial
level. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) provide theoretical foundations to the traditional gravity-trade model,
emphasizing the endogeneity of “multilateral prices” that affect the trade volume. The so called multilateral
prices (or multilateral resistance terms) measure the effects of the interactions between an importing country
and all the importing country’s other trade partners on the trade flows between a specific country and
this importing country. For example, consider a world with only three countries, i.e. country A, B, and
C. Country A and B make exports to country C and country C imposes tariff on the products from both
countries. When country C reduces the tariff rate on the products from country A but keeps the tariff rate
towards country B, then country C will import more from country A but less from country B. Here, the
multilateral resistance terms measure the effects of the change of tariff rate towards country A on the trading
between country B and C. Furthermore, in the case of the tariff rate, we can reinterpret the effects captured
by the multilateral resistance terms as the relative effect of the tariff, i.e. reduction of tariff rate towards
country A will crow out the importing from country B. Similarly, the increase of importing from country A
can be called the direct effect of the change of tariff rate. In this paper, we also emphasize the interactions
of the consumption of domestic products on the effectiveness of the multilateral resistance terms. Based on
our analysis, the effectiveness of the multilateral tariffs (relative effect of tariff) will be relatively weak if the
importing countries consume a high ratio of domestic products.
The difficulty to apply the model of Anderson and Wincoop (2003) into empirical analysis is that the
multilateral resistance terms are in complex non-linear forms and also as functions of each other. That
means we cannot solve the multilateral resistance terms as formulas of a plenty of exogenous variables
(multilateral trade costs). To solve this issue, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use the first order Taylor-
expansion skill to linearize the multilateral resistance terms, then estimate the border effects on trade using
the US-Canada trade data. In this paper, we apply the estimation skill of Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
to the study at industrial level: firstly, we redefine the utility function of consumers in order to feature
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the heterogeneity among industries; secondly, considering the production and consumption volume may be
different at the country-industrial level (happening in most cases in reality), we proof that the linearization
skill suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009) still works with this case; 1 lastly, as we cannot construct a
similar indicator for the multilateral resistance terms as Baier and Bergstrand (2009) due to the data-missing
issue at the country-industrial level, we approximate a new formula for this indicator with some conventional
assumptions on consumers’ preferences, reshaping the indicator as a complexity of two feasible indices, i.e.
industry’s horizontal penetration ratio and import-weighted average tariff rate. In summary, our research
provides both theoretical foundations and empirical methods to estimate the direct and relative effects of
the tariff at country-industrial level, emphasizing the heterogeneity across industries and countries. Using
Chinese industrial data, we confirm the main predictions of our theoretical analysis: (i) reducing the tariff
rate faced by some original country, the importing country will import more from this country but reduce the
imports from the other countries; (ii) the relative effect is more effective at the industry where the importing
penetration ratio is relatively high in the importing country; and (iii) the effectiveness of the direct effect is
heterogeneous across industries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature and discuss
our contributions to the existing studies. Section 3 constructs a variation of the conventional gravity-trade
model to fit the industrial level analysis. Section 4 empirically tests our theoretical predictions using the
Chinese industrial data and section 5 checks the robustness of our empirical estimations. Section 6 concludes
our research findings and contributions.
2 Literature Review
The relevant literature that relates to our study can be classified as two groups. The first group of studies
estimate the effects of the import tariff on trade performance. The traditional estimation method on this issue
is based on a partial equilibrium model which only considers the change of the bilateral tariff rates imposed by
the importing country on a specific exporting country, and ignores the interactions of the multilateral tariffs
1As Bair and Bergstrand (2009) study the issue at the national aggregate level, the production and consumption volume
should be equal.
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imposed on the other trade partners of the importing country. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) compute out
the multilateral resistance terms from the traditional gravity model and further proof that the multilateral
trade costs make effects on the bilateral trade. Like the other types of trade costs, the tariff can be categorized
as the bilateral and multilateral tariffs. Under the WTO trading system, each member country imposes the
MFN tariff rates on the imported products from other member countries. In this situation, we can ignore the
effects of the multilateral tariffs. However, as the growing of the regional free trade agreements, more and
more countries set heterogeneity tariff rates towards different trade partners, which makes the estimation be
biased without taking the multilateral tariffs into consideration. The traditional studies treat the MFN tariff
as the average tariff rate imposed by an importing country, and use the gap between the MFN and preferential
tariff rates as the measurement of the preferential margin (World Bank, 2005 and Magee, 2015). However,
as the fast growing of the number of preferential trade agreements, it becomes more and more biased to use
the MFN tariff rate as the indicator for the average tariff rate. To solve this issue, many researches begin
to use the actual tariff rates imposed by the importing country towards its trade partners and compute a
weighted average tariff rate with the trade volume as the weight, for example Fugazza and Nicita (2013),
Fugazza and McLaren (2014), and Carrère et al. (2010). In this paper, we add to the existing literature
with emphasizing the competition between the foreign and domestic producers. In an importing market,
the foreign firms face the competition not only from the other foreign producers, but also with the domestic
products of this country. Due to the emerging of the home market effects, the imported products may be
in disadvantage position when competing with the domestic products. For example, the consumers may
prefer more on domestic products, and government sets invisible market barriers towards the foreign firms.
To control the home market effects, we re-scale the multilateral resistance terms by the import penetration
ratio, which measures the proportion of the foreign products in the market. As the tariff rate on domestic
products is zero, we may over-estimate the multilateral resistance terms and preferential margin if the sales
of domestic products are not taken into computation. In addition, some existing literature also suggest to
take the intra-national trade into consideration when approximating the gravity model, i.e. Yotov (2012),
Dai et al. (2014), and Yotov et al. (2016).
Another group of studies focus on the trade creation and trade diversion of the regional trade agreement
(RTA). As pointed by Viner (1950), on one hand the RTA reduces the bilateral tariff rates and non-tariff
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barriers directly, and thus increases the trade flows among the member countries of the agreement, which
is known as the trade creation effect of the RTA; on the other hand, the tariff reduction processes among
the RTA member countries will increase the relative trade costs of the non-member countries, and cause the
substitution of imported products from the non-member countries with those from the regional countries.
The second effect is the so called trade diversion effect. Many literature study the trade creation and diversion
effects of the RTA empirically. The key literature on this issue include Magee (2008), Baier and Bergstrand
(2007, 2009), Baler et al. (2014), and Limão (2016). All these researches allow a dummy to indicate the
effective of the RTA, instead of using the real values of the change of tariff rates. With this method, we
can control the changes of the non-tariff and post border barriers after the effective of the RTA, but ignore
the effectiveness-heterogeneity of the RTAs with different tariff-reduction scales. Based on the discussion by
Limão (2016), we can perfectly estimate the trade creation effect of the RTA using the structural gravity
model. However, Magee (2008) argues that the structural gravity model is not suitable for estimating the
trade diversion effect, because the information regarding the number of RTAs signed by a country is fully
absorbed by the dummies that control for the exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects. To solve this
issue, Dai et al. (2014) suggest to allow a dummy to indicate whether the country signs RTAs with other
countries, instead of computing the number of RTAs signed by this country. However, this method also
fails to accurately identify the trade diversion effect because the number of RTAs are much different across
countries. Comparing with the existing literature, this paper proposes a new method to accurately estimate
the trade creation and diversion effects using the industrial level of tariff data. Based on our specification,
the elasticity of the bilateral tariff rate measures the trade creation effect and the elasticity of the multilateral
tariff rate measures the trade diversion effect.
3 Theoretical Model
Xijk =
(
piktijk
Pjk
)1−σ
αjkYj (1)
whereXijk is the exporting value of product k from country i to j; pik is the price of product k produced by
country i ; tijk measures the marginal trade cost between the countries i and j , i.e. tijk ≡ ςijk (1 + τijk)
σ
σ−1 ,
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where ςijk captures the ice-berg costs and τijk is the tariff rate ; and αjk is the consumption share of product
k in country j (out of the country j’s GDP).
After clearing up the market k in country i , we obtain the following condition:
βikYi = p
1−σ
ik
∑
j
(
tijk
Pjk
)1−σ
αjkYj
 (2)
where βik is the output share of product k in country i (out of the country i’s GDP).
Following this result, we further get:
Xijk =
(
βikαjkYiYj
α¯kY T
)
t1−σijk
P 1−σjk Π
1−σ
ik
(3)
where Pjk =
[∑
i
βikYi
α¯kY T
(
tijk
Πik
)1−σ] 11−σ
, Πik =
[∑
j
αjkYj
α¯kY T
(
tijk
Pjk
)1−σ] 11−σ
, and α¯k is consumption (or equi-
valently the output ) share of product k in the whole world.
Applying the method by Baier and Bergstrand (2009), we linearize the equation (3) as:
lnXijk = lnβik + lnαjk + lnYi + lnYj − (σ − 1)lntijk
+(σ − 1)
[(∑
l
αlkYl
α¯kY T
lntilk
)
+
(∑
m
βmkYm
α¯kY T
lntmjk
)
−
(∑
l
∑
m
αlkβmkYlYm
(α¯kY T )
2 lntmlk
)]
(4)
To fit our data structure, we make the following adjustments of equation (4):
lnXjkt = β0 − σln (1 + τmjkt) + σΘjkt
[∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjkt)
]
+ δjk + δjt + δkt (5)
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where Θjkt ≡ importjktimportjkt+value−addedjkt−exportjkt is the horizontal import penetration of the sector k in
country j at the year t; ρmkt is the import share from country m ; and the term
∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjkt)
computes the import-weighted average of import tariff imposed by country j at sector k. To manipulate the
index Θjkt , we may use the following three methods:
2We omit the denote i here because in our data set only one country make exporting.
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(i) If the data are available for computing the horizontal penetration ratio in each country-sector level,
we can compute the index Θjkt directly.
(ii) If we assume the import penetration ratio is constant over time, we may allow country-sector dummies
on the termσ
[∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjkt)
]
or use the fixed (random) effects method.
(iii) We may make very strong assumption on the index Θjkt, i.e. Θjkt = Θ is constant across countries,
sectors, and years.
4 Empirical Applications
4.1 Data
In this paper, the export value data are retrieved from the BACI database of the CEPII website. This
database provides the data of export values in XX industries, which are categorized by HS6 code (1992),
across XX countries covering the years 1995 to 2013. To match the other variables’ data, we convert the export
value data from the HS6 code to the ISIC rev3 4-digit sector category. Using these data, we also compute
the import and export values at the nation-industrial level. The data for the domestic production value
are retrieved from the INDSTAT4 2018 ISIC Rev.3 database of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO). This database provides the data of the industrial output values from 127 sectors
which are classified by the 4-digit ISIC code in 122 countries. These data are originally collected from the
National Bureau of Statistics in each country. Using the data from the BACI database, we can compute the
import penetration ratio at the country-industrial level. Here, what we should emphasize is that the following
factors may cause computation errors on the import penetration ratio: the measurement of the product price,
heterogeneity of the industrial categorization methods, and the inconsistency of the statistics scopes between
the output and trade data. Firstly, the output value is usually computed based on the producers’ prices, while
the transaction value is treated as the trade value. Secondly, in each country, the industrial categorization
method is based on the industrial structure of this country, which means that different countries may use
different methods to design the industrial category code. The errors may arise when converting these codes to
the ISIC sector code. lastly, the statistics scopes of the output and trade data are different. For example, the
Chinese manufacturing database only covers the samples of the state-owned industrial enterprises and non-
7
state-owned industrial enterprises with annual revenue from principal business above 5 million yuan, while the
Chinese customs database records all the trade transactions. In this case, we will relatively under-measure
the domestic output value. Due to all the causes discussed above, we find nearly 2.4% of the computed
import penetration ratios are in negative values, and around 17.3% of them are greater than 1. We drop the
samples with negative values and substitute the values that are greater than 1 with 1.
Another concern we need to take notice is that the INDSTAT4 2016 ISIC Rev. 3 database reduced the
statistics size on the ISIC Rev.3 manufacturing industries after 2008. We use the data from the INDSTAT4
2016 ISIC Rev.4 database to replace these missing data. As many data from ISIC Rev.4 and ISIC Rev.3
databases are not one-to-one uniquely matching, we only use the data that can be uniquely converted between
the both databases. Our sample size increases by 8% after this manipulation.
The sources of the tariff data in this paper are the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and Trade
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS). Each country usually decides the tariff rate based on the HS
code in 8, 10 or 12 digits. As the designation of the industrial categories above the 6 digits is different across
countries, the TRAINS computes a simple average of the tariff rates and generates an aggregate tariff rate at
the 6 digits level. Generally, there are three types of tariff regimes: (i) general tariff rate, which is imposed
on the products from the non-member countries; (ii) MFN tariff rate, which is imposed on the products from
the WTO members; and (iii) preferential tariff rate (PTR), which is imposed on the products from the RTA
members. Based on the collection methods, the tariffs are classified as the ad valorem tariff, the specific tariff,
and the compound tariff. The most common is an ad valorem tariff. For the samples with the other types
of the TRAINS converts other forms of tariffs into the ad valorem equivalents of non ad valorem tariffs.We
make the following adjustments on the original data from the TRAINS database. We adopt the Effective
applied tariff rates to measure the bilateral tariff. Specifically, if the preferential tariff data are available,
we adopt these data, but when the data are missing, we substitute the missing values with the MFN tariff
rates. Obviously, we may need to tolerate some estimation biases to approximate the Effective applied tariff
rates with this method, however, to our best acknowledge, this is the optimal estimation method we can
adopt. Secondly, we use the weighted Effective applied tariff rates across countries reported by the TRAINS
to measure the multilateral tariff term. Thirdly, as the Chinese output data are classified with the ISIC code,
we convert the data with the HS6 code into the ISIC classification code. Then we compute the weighted
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average tariff rates using the tariff data from the TRAINS and classified with the ISIC code, weighted by
the import values. Fourthly, as the European countries impose the identical tariff rates to the countries out
of the region, we use the European Union’s tariff rates as the national import tariff rates for each European
country. Lastly, we eliminate the samples whose tariff rates are greater than 100%. Merging the bilateral
tariff and the exporting value datasets, we obtain 250,796 observations. As the Chinese output data only
cover the manufacturing sectors and the data missing issue is serious in some years (e.g. 2009-2013), we
lose much more observations with adding the multilateral tariff terms into our regression model. With the
multilateral tariff rates, our sample size is largely reduced to 64,683, covering 114 nations and 119 industries.
[Add table1here]
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 reports our baseline results. We control the country-industry, country-year, and industry-year fixed
effects in all regressions. 3 In the first model (column 1), we estimate the correlation between the bilateral
tariff and the trade flows without controlling the multilateral resistance terms. Consistent with our expecta-
tion, we observe a significantly negative coefficient on the variable bilateral tariff rate, which indicates that
the importing volume from a specific country is negatively affected by the tariff rate imposed on the products
from this country. In the second regression model (column 2), we add the MFN tariff rate to control for the
multilateral resistance terms. In this regression, we find that the scale of the coefficient on bilateral tariff does
not change significantly, but the coefficient on the MFN tariff rate is insignificant. We suppose there are two
reasons for this insignificance: firstly, the MFN tariff is strongly related with the bilateral tariff faced by China
because Chinese firms enjoy the MFN tariff rates in some countries, which results in the multiple-linearity
issue; Secondly, the variations of the MFN tariff rates are very little over our observation years, and because
of this the effects of the MFN tariff rate are largely absorbed by the country-industry fixed effects. In the
third model (column 3), we construct the indicator for the multilateral resistance terms as the product of the
import penetration ratio (industrial level) and the MFN tariff rate, i.e. Θjkt ∗MFN−tariffijkt . 4 Different
from the results of model 2, we observe a significantly positive coefficient on the variable that indicates for the
3Specifically, we use the Stata package REGHDFE developed by Correia, S. (2017) to do the regressions.
4The size of observations largly decreases from 249577 to 58464 because some values for the import penetration ratio are
missing.
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multilateral resistance terms, which means that if the importing country increases the tariff rate towards the
country other than China, the importing flows from China will increase. Comparing the results between the
first and second models, we find that it is important for accurately measuring the effects of the multilateral
resistance to take the import penetration ratio into account. In the forth model (column 4), we measure the
multilateral resistance as the weighted average tariff rate with the origin-based import values as weights, i.e∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjkt). The value-weighted average of tariff rate is a traditional indicator for the multilateral
resistance terms. In this regression, we find a significantly positive coefficient on the weighted average tariff
rate. In the fifth model (column 5), we compute the indicator for multilateral resistance as the product of
the import penetration ratio of the importer and the average tariff rate weighted by the import values, i.e.
Θjkt ∗
[∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjkt)
]
. Comparing with the forth model, we find a larger scale of the coefficient
on the multilateral resistance terms. It indicates that we may underestimate the effects of the multilateral
resistance terms in the forth model. The intuitive explanations for the difference between results of model 4
and 5 is as follows. As pointed out by some existing literature, e.g. Hanson and Xiang (2004), consumers may
prefer more on the domestic products and the government also conducts some preferential policies for the
domestic producers. That means the foreign and domestic firms usually face unequal market competition.
In this case, we need to take the import penetration ratios (or domestic consumption ratios) in each market
into consideration and re-scale the weighted average tariff rate by the import penetration ratio. A smaller
import penetration ratio means that Chinese firms (exporter) will face higher competition intensity from the
domestic firms in the importing market but less from the other trade partners of the importing country. In
this case, without involving the import penetration ratio, the weighted average tariff rate will over measure
the scale of the multilateral resistance terms and thus leads to the underestimation of the effects. As the
sample size reduces significantly from model 4 to 5, we may concern that the result difference between both
models could be attributed to the sample losses. In this case, we replicate the regression of model 4 but
using the samples which show up in model 5 and report the relevant results in the last column. In the last
estimation, we find a significantly positive coefficient on the multilateral resistance terms, which result is
similar as that of model 4, indicating that our results are robust to the change of sample size.
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Table 2 The direct and relative effects of tariffs: basic estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bilateral Tariff -1.005*** -0.956*** -0.922*** -1.237*** -1.025*** -0.919***
(0.095) (0.129) (0.252) (0.126) (0.255) (0.277)
Multilateral Tariff -0.110 0.444*** 0.493*
(0.169) (0.142) (0.269)
Multilateral Tariff*Import Penetration 1.442*** 1.749***
(0.360) (0.306)
Importer-Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.922 0.922 0.943 0.922 0.943 0.943
Number of observations 249457 249457 63536 249457 63536 63536
Number of importers 177 177 105 177 105 105
Number of industries 144 144 119 144 119 119
Standard errors clustered by importer-industry. Significant at *** 1%, **5%, and *10%
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative specifications of the key indicators
In this section, we will check the robustness of our baseline estimation results. The first concern is that the
simultaneity bias may arise when constructing the weighted average tariff rate using the importing value
as weights: the importing value is endogenously determined by the tariff rate. To eliminate the potential
simultaneity issue, we try two alternative methods to estimate the weighted average tariff rate, i.e. using
the initial year’s values as weights and keep the weights over time, or computing a simple average tariff rate
with the same weight. The column 1 of table 2 reports the results with the simple average tariff rate, and
it shows that the results do not change significantly from our previous estimation results with the weighted
average tariff rate. In the second column of the table, we follow the method of Fugazza and Nicita (2013) and
construct the weighted average tariff rate using the time-fixed weights which are computed as the average
of importing value from each trade partner over three initial years, 1995 to 1997. In column 3, we use the
method suggested by Haveman et al. (2003) and compute the relevant weights using each trade partner’s
total exporting value in each year. The regressions in column 4 and 5 take the misusing of the preferential
tariff rates (PTRs) into consideration. In order to prevent the non-member countries from taking free ride on
the PTR policy, the RTA members usually decide the qualification of the PTRs on products based on their
national origins, where the national origins are distinguished according to the rules of origins. Specifically,
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the rules of origins require the products which benefit from the PTRs to satisfy the rule that their major
production process or vital transformation is made within the geographic region of the RTA member countries.
As the growing of intra-industrial trade and international co-operations in production processes, it’s more
and more costly for the firms to meet the requirements of the rules of origins. Firstly, in order to meet the
rules of origins, the firms may decide their sources of intermediate inputs based on the origins rather than the
qualities and prices of the inputs. Secondly, the firms need to spend more management fees to certify that
their products meet the rules, because their intermediate inputs are sourced from more and more origins.
Due to the rising of the cost, the firms may not ask for the PTRs, and they may face tariff rates higher
than the PTRs. However, it is difficult to get the actual tariff rate faced by each firm and fully solve this
issue. Instead, we try the following method to solve this issue partially. According to the approximations
of Francois et.al (2006), the firms will choose the PTRs only if the MFN tariff rate is higher than the PER
by 4%. In another study, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) estimate the same critical value as 2.5%. Following
these studies, we assume that the firms will choose the MFN tariff rate when the difference between the MFN
tariff rate and the PER is small enough. In column 4, we report the regression results with the assumption
that the firms choose the MFN tariff rate when the difference between both types of tariff rates is less than
2.5%. In column 5, we run a similar regression as column 4 but re-set the critical value for the difference
as 4%. Unsurprisingly, all these robustness check results are consistent with our baseline regression models.
In column 6, we replicate the estimation with taking the simultaneity bias issue arising when computing
the import penetration ratio into consideration. For example, if the bilateral tariff rates decrease, both the
importing volume from the origin country and the import penetration ratio of the importing country will
increase simultaneously. Using the similar method as the one discussed in previous content, we replace the
original import penetration ratio with the time-fixed import penetration ratio which is averaged over the
years 1995 to 1997 to solve this issue. Because lots of data are missing after 2009, the sample size enlarges
when we use the time-fixed import penetration ratio. The estimation of column 6 shows an identical results
as previous models. Besides all the robustness checks discussed above, we also check the case when we use
the fixed import penetration ratio, fixed importing weights, and consider the availability ratio of the PTRs
simultaneously, and find the results are still consistent with our previous ones.
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Table 3 The direct and relative effects of tariffs: robustness checks on variable measurement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bilateral Tariff -0.792*** -0.673*** -0.816*** -0.871*** -0.870*** -0.826***
(0.263) (0.256) (0.263) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261)
Multilateral Tariff*Import Penetration 1.572*** 1.059*** 1.679*** 1.900*** 1.900 *** 0.905**
(0.301) (0.325) (0.336) (0.329) (0.329) (0.400)
R2 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.941
Number of observations 63629 63638 63671 63688 63688 76108
Standard errors clustered by importer-industry. Significant at *** 1%, **5%, and *10%
5.2 Robustness of the model specification
In the first column of table 4, we control the variable import penetration ratio. In the second column, we
control the consumption of each product in each country. Following Baler et al. (2014), we also try the
difference-in-difference method to estimate the effects of the tariff on the trade performance. (See the column
3 of table 4) The reasons for adopting the difference-in-difference method is as follows: firstly, the tariff may
have long-run effects on trading, however the fixed effects dummies may be inefficiency in a long period;
secondly, considering the export value and tariff rate may be unit-root processes, Wooldridge (2000, p. 447)
points out that the fixed effects estimation method may create the spurious regressions. Finally, in the
last column, we consider the incomplete pass-through of the tariff, and run the regression using the export
quantity as the dependent variable.
Table 4. The direct and relative effects of tariffs: alternative model specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral Tariff -0.899*** -1.220*** -1.000*** -1.108***
(0.257) (0.256) (0.261) (0.313)
Multilateral Tariff*Import Penetration 1.160*** 2.832*** 1.763*** 1.958***
(0.326) (0.324) (0.314) (0.407)
Import Penetration Ratio 0.299***
(0.059)
Consumption 0.258***
(0.017)
R2 0.943 0.944 0.943 0.914
Number of observations 63536 63536 62447 63203
Standard errors clustered by importer-industry. Significant at *** 1%, **5%, and *10%
13
5.3 Other potential issues
Table 5 reports the results for checking the robustness when taking the effective lags of the tariff policies
and the interactions of some other trade barriers on our results into account. TRAINS only investigates
two types of bilateral tariff, i.e. the MFN tariff and preferential tariff, ignoring the general tariff imposed
by the member countries on the products from the non-member countries. Although China had already
enjoyed the MFN tariff rates in most countries before her entry into the WTO in 2001, some countries may
still impose the general tariff rates on Chinese products after 2002. Thus, in the regression reported in
column 1, we drop the samples before 2002. For the same reason, instead of dropping the data before 2002,
we eliminate the samples of the non-members of the WTO at the observation year and report the relevant
results in column 2. Column 3 discusses the missing issue of the preferential tariff policy. When referring
to the tariff-reduction schedule in the regional trade agreements signed between China and other countries
and the signature years of the agreements, we find the data are missing for the following country-year pairs :
Peru (2011-2013), Pakistan (2009-2010), Chile (2013), Vietnam (2008-2009), Brunei (2006, 2010, 2012, 2013),
Cambodia (2007), Indonesia (2008), Malaysia (2005, 2006, 2010-2013), Myanmar (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009,
2012, 2013), Philipines (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010), Singapore (2005, 2006, 2011), Thailand (2006-2013),
New Zealand (2011, 2012). TRAINS uses the MFN tariff rates to replace the missing values of the PTRs. To
avoid any bias arising due to this manipulation, we drop all the missing values of the PTRs in the regression
of column 3. The estimation of column 4 considers the interactions of the non-tariff trade barriers on our
results. It is still unclear about the relationship between the tariff and non-tariff trade barriers: some times,
countries potentially set high tariff and non-tariff barriers simultaneously to protect their domestic producers
and we will observe a positive correlation between the two types of trade barriers; in some other cases, when
a country promises to reduce the import tariff, it may set some invisible non-tariff barriers at the same time
to substitute the function of tariff, in which case we will see a negative correlation between both barriers.
In this case, we cannot confirm how our estimation results are affected without controlling the effects of
the non-tariff barriers. This paper doesn’t discuss the case with the non-tariff trade barriers due to two
reasons. Firstly, as pointed by Egger and Nelson (2011), the non-tariff barriers are mostly concentrated in
the agricultural sector, but our research focuses on the manufacturing sector. Secondly, the data regarding
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the non-tariff barriers are very little. In the manufacturing sector, a typical example of the non-tariff barrier is
the quota restriction set by U.S., Canada, and European Union on the textile products from China. In 2005,
all countries terminate this quota restriction policy. To reduce the interactions of the quota restriction on our
estimation results, in the regression of column 4, we eliminate the samples from the textile sector. 5 Lastly,
considering the potential interactions of the financial crisis on our results, we drop the samples of the years
2008 and 2009 in column 5. In column 6, the incomplete pass-through of tariff is taken into consideration,
and the dependent variable is replaced with the exporting quantity (instead of exporting value). Again, all
these robustness check results are consistent with our baseline estimation models.
The last concern is the zero-trade issue. Many researches argue that ignoring the effects of the zero-trade
samples may lead to the covariance heterogeneity and sample selection issues, i.e. Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). In this case, they suggest to adopt the PPML model or the two
stages estimation method to control the selection issue. In this paper, we don’t consider the zero-trade issue
because the zero-trade samples take very small proportion in our sample.
Table 5 The direct and relative effects of tariffs: checking other robustness concerns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bilateral Tariff -0.901*** -0.766*** -1.000*** -1.043*** -0.958***
(0.299) (0.267) (0.261) (0.263) (0.267)
Multilateral Tariff*Import Penetration 1.534*** 1.708*** 1.763*** 1.708*** 1.877***
(0.351) (0.310) (0.314) (0.313) (0.323)
R2 0.954 0.945 0.943 0.942 0.944
Number of observations 42752 59631 62447 62262 56453
Standard errors clustered by importer-industry. Significant at *** 1%, **5%, and *10%
6 Conclusion
It is usually ignored to distinguish the heterogeneity across industries among the existing literature which
study the direct and relative effects of trade cost on trade performances. To the best of our acknowledge, all
the previous studies on this issue are focused on the national aggregate level. In this paper, we adjust the
conventional gravity-trading model to fit the empirical analysis at the industrial level and also proof that we
can still use the Taylor-expansion method suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to linearize this adjusted
version of the conventional model. In addition, to solve the issue that the data are missing for the globally
5The eliminated samples are mostly distributed in two industries, i.e. Preparation and spinning of textile fibres; weaving of
textiles (1711), and Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel (1810).
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industrial aggregate output, we decompose the multilateral consistence terms as a product of the nation-
industrial level of import penetration ratio and a weighted average import tariff rate at the nation-industrial
level with some assumption on the consumers’ tastes across countries. We use the Chinese costume data to
test the predictions of our theoretical model and have the following main findings: (i) reducing the tariff rate
faced by some original country, the importing country will import more from this country but reduce the
imports from the other countries; (ii) the relative effect is more effective at the industry where the import
penetration ratio is relatively high in the importing country; and (iii) the omission of the import penetration
ratio will underestimate the effects of the multilateral terms and also affects the scale of the coefficient on
the bilateral tariff rate. In summary, our research contributes to the existing literature by introducing a
manipulable method to compute the direct and relative effects of the trade cost at the industrial level, and
emphasizing the industrial heterogeneity and the importance of involving the import penetration ratio in to
consideration, which distinguishes the competition from the foreign or domestic producers.
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Appendix
Proof of equation (4):
Define t˜ijk ≡ tijk/t, P˜jk ≡ Pjk/t 12 , Π˜ik ≡ Πik/t 12 , bik ≡ βikYiα¯kY T , and ajk ≡
αjkYj
α¯kY T
.
If all countries face symmetric trade cost, i.e. tijk = t for ∀i, j, k, the centralized tariff rate is directly sol-
ved as t˜ijk = 1. Following this result, we have Π˜ik
1−σ
=
∑
j
ajkP˜jk
σ−1
or equivalently 1 =
∑
j
ajk
(
Π˜ikP˜jk
)σ−1
.
As noted in Feenstra (2004, p. 158, footnote 11), the solution to this equation is P˜jk = Π˜ik = 1.
Before the log-linearization process, it is convenient to rewrite the equations for Pjk and Πik as:

(1− σ) elnPjk = ∑
i
elnbike(1−σ)lntijke(σ−1)lnΠik
(1− σ) elnΠik = ∑
j
elnajke(1−σ)lntijke(σ−1)lnPjk
(6)
Making first order log linearization of the equations above at the point
(
Π˜ik, P˜jk, t˜ijk
)
= (1, 1, 1), we
obtain the following equations:

lnPjk = −
∑
i
biklnΠik +
∑
i
biklntijk
lnΠik = −
∑
j
ajklnPjk +
∑
j
ajklntijk
(7)
To solve for lnPjk and lnΠik, we can simplify the problem with considering the case with only three
countries. To simplify our notation in math steps, we define the following variables: Xjk ≡ lnPjk, Yik ≡ lnΠik,
extik ≡
∑
j
ajklntijk, and imtjk ≡
∑
i
biklntijk. Following equation set (7) with assuming the number of
countries is three, we have the following equation set:
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
Y1k = −
3∑
j
ajkXjk + ext1k
Y2k = −
3∑
j
ajkXjk + ext2k
Y2k = −
3∑
j
ajkXjk + ext2k
X1k = −
3∑
i
bikYik + imt1k
X2k = −
3∑
i
bikYik + imt2k
X3k = −
3∑
i
bikYik + imt3k
(8)
Normalizing the price index for country 1 in sector ι as X1l = 1, and we write the price index for country
1 in sector k as ρ1k ≡ X1k/X1l . Following these settings, we solve the equation set (8) as:

Y1k = −ρ1k + imt1k −
3∑
j
ajkimtjk + ext1k
Y2k = −ρ1k + imt1k −
3∑
j
ajkimtjk + ext2k
Y2k = −ρ1k + imt1k −
3∑
j
ajkimtjk + ext3k
X1k = ρ1k
X2k = ρ1k + imt2k − imt1k
X3k = ρ1k + imt3k − imt1k
(9)
Following equation set (9), we obtain the equation (4) directly.
Q.E.D.
Proof of equation (5):
In this proof, we focus on the transformation of the term
∑
m
βmkYm
α¯kY T
ln (1 + τmjk) to Θjkt
(∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjk)
)
.
Assume the consumption ratio of country j on product k out of the total output of product k of the
country i as γijk ≡ XijkβikYi . Also we have γijk ≡
Xijk
βikYi
=
t1−σijk αjkYj
P 1−σjk Π
1−σ
ik
. If we assume that the term
t1−σijk αjkYj
P 1−σjk Π
1−σ
ik
≈
αjkYj ∗ constantk, then we have γijk is identical across i, i.e. γijk ≈ γjk. That means the country j will
consume the same ratio of product k across all countries. The reasonability of this assumption relays on
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two points: firstly, at the starting point where we make our linearization, the trade costs across countries
are assumed as identical, and at this point the equation γijk = γjk naturally holds; secondly, as the Taylor-
expansion formula is an approximation of the original function using the information at the point where all
trade costs are identical, we believe that the term
∑
m
βmkYm
α¯kY T
ln (1 + τmjk) approximately measures the average
tariff rate weighted by the consumption ratio from each country. In this case, our transformation of the the
term
∑
m
βmkYm
α¯kY T
ln (1 + τmjk) is to restore the information it describes. Following this assumption, we have∑
m
βmkYmln(1+τmjk)
α¯kY T
=
∑
m
γjkβmkYmln(1+τmjk)
γjkα¯kY T
≈∑
m
γmjkβmkYmln(1+τmjk)
γjkα¯kY T
.
Then we have∑
m
γmjkβmkYmln(1+τmjk)
γjkα¯kY T
=
∑
m
import−valuemjk∗ln(1+τmjk)∑
m
import−valuemjk∗ln(1+τmjk)+domstic−valuejk−export−valuejk
=
∑
m
import−valuemjk∗lntmjk∑
m
import−valuemjk
∗
∑
m
import−valuemjk∑
m
import−valuemjk∗ln(1+τmjk)+domstic−valuejk−export−valuejk
= Θjkt
[∑
m
ρmjktln (1 + τmjk)
]
6
Q.E.D.
6∑
m
γmjkβmkYmln
(
1 + τmjk
)
=
∑
m 6=j
import−valuemjk ∗ ln
(
1 + τmjk
)
+ domestic−valuejk ∗ ln
(
1 + τmjk
)
.However, as
ln
(
1 + τmjk
)
= 0 (no tariff within one country),
∑
m
γmjkβmkYmln
(
1 + τmjk
)
=
∑
m 6=j
import−valuemjk ∗ ln
(
1 + τmjk
)
.
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